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The effort in this paper is to recover the ways in which the state par-
ticipates in governing the global economy in a context increasingly
dominated by deregulation, privatization, and the growing authority of
non-state actors. A key organizing proposition, derived from my previ-
ous work on global cities' is the embeddedness of much of globalization
in national territory, that is to say, in a geographic terrain that has been
encased in an elaborate set of national laws and administrative capaci-
ties. The embeddedness of the global requires at least a partial lifting of
these national encasements and hence signals a necessary participation
by the state, even when it concerns the state's own withdrawal from
regulating the economy.
One question this raises is whether this participation might entail the
formation of a specific type of authority/power for the state in global
systems-both for the state as such and/or for the particular state institu-
tions involved. Does the weight of private, often foreign, interests in this
specific work of the state become constitutive of that authority and in-
deed produce a hybrid that is neither fully private nor fully public? My
argument is that, indeed, we are seeing the incipient formation of a type
of authority and state practice that entail a partial denationalizing of
what had been constructed historically as national. This denationalizing
consists of several specific processes, including importantly, the re-
orienting of national agendas toward global ones, and the circulation of
private agendas dressed as public policy. Such a conceptualization intro-
duces a twist in the analysis of private authority because it seeks to
t This chapter is part of the author's larger multi-year research project to be pub-
lished as DENATIONALIZATION: TERRITORY, AUTHORITY AND RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL DIGITAL
AGE (Princeton Univ. Press 2005).
* Saskia Sassen, Ralph Lewis Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago, and
Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of Economics. Her new book is DENATIONALI-
ZATION: TERRITORY, AUTHORITY AND RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL DIGITAL AGE (Princeton Univ.
Press 2005). Her books are translated into fifteen languages. She has just completed for
UNESCO a five-year project on sustainable human settlement for which she set up a network
of researchers and activists in over thirty countries. She serves on several editorial boards and
is an advisor to several international bodies.
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detect the presence of private agendas inside the state, rather than the
more common focus on the shift of state functions to the private sector,
including private forms of authority. It differs from an older scholarly
tradition on the captured state which focused on cooptation of states by
private actors. In contrast to this older tradition, I emphasize the privati-
zation of norm-making capacities and the enactment of private norms in
the public domain.
The purpose here is, then, to understand and specify a particular as-
pect of globalization and the state which is lost in what are typically
rather dualized accounts of this relation; in such accounts, the spheres of
influence of respectively the national and the global, and of state and
non-state actors, are seen as distinct and mutually exclusive. Even if
many components of each of these spheres are separate and mutually
exclusive, I argue that this still leaves a specific set of conditions or
components that does not fit in this dual structure. Key among these are
some components of the work of ministries of finance, central banks,
and the increasingly specialized technical regulatory agencies, such as
those concerned with finance, telecommunications, and competition pol-
icy. In this regard then, my position is not comfortably subsumed under
the proposition that nothing has much changed in terms of sovereign
state power, nor can it be subsumed under the proposition of the declin-
ing significance of the state.
An important methodological assumption here is that focusing on
economic globalization can help us disentangle some of these issues pre-
cisely because in strengthening the legitimacy of claims by foreign
investors and firms it adds to and renders visible the work of accommo-
dating their rights and contracts in what remain basically national
economies. However, these dynamics can also be present when privatiza-
tion and deregulation concern native firms and investors-pace the fact
that, in much of the world, privatization and deregulation have been con-
stituted through the entry of foreign investors and firms.
The first half of this paper will introduce a number of conceptual is-
sues about the mix of processes we have come to group under the term
globalization. Using a multi-scalar analytics allows us to see that subna-
tional processes and institutions are also critical sites for globalization.
Accepting the proposition that the global is multi-scalar leads to its con-
ceptualizing as at least partly consisting of the denationalizing of specific
forms of state authority which results from the location of particular com-
ponents of global processes in national institutional orders. This is the
subject of the second half of the paper. Mapping this conceptualization
against the mainstream scholarship on the state and globalization, the ar-
gument moves on to sketch out the particular substance and conditionality
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of what I argue is a new mode of state authority that remains insuffi-
ciently recognized and theorized. Though housed or located in national
state capacities and institutions, this mode of authority is not national in
the way we had come to understand this feature of states over the last
century. The empirical focus for much of the examination is confined to
states under the so-called rule of law, and especially the United States
I. GLOBALIZATION AND DENATIONALIZATION
What is it we are trying to name with the term globalization? In my
reading of the evidence it is actually two distinct sets of dynamics. One
of these involves the formation of explicitly global institutions and proc-
esses, such as the World Trade Organization, global financial markets,
the new cosmopolitanism, the war crimes tribunals. The practices and
organizational forms through which these dynamics operate are constitu-
tive of what are typically thought of as global scales.
But there is a second set of processes that does not necessarily scale
at the global level as such yet, which I argue, is part of globalization.
These processes take place deep inside territories and institutional do-
mains that have largely been constructed in national terms in much,
though by no means all, of the world. What makes these processes part
of globalization even though localized in national, indeed subnational
settings, is that they involve transboundary networks and formations
connecting or articulating multiple local or "national" processes and ac-
tors. Among these processes I include particular aspects of the work of
states, the subject of the second half of this paper. Examples are specific
monetary and fiscal policies critical to the constitution of global markets
that are hence being implemented in a growing number of countries as
these become integrated into global markets. Other instances are cross-
border networks of activists engaged in specific localized struggles with
an explicit or implicit global agenda, as is the case with many human
rights and environmental organizations; particular aspects of the work of
states, e.g., certain monetary and fiscal policies critical to the constitu-
tion of global markets that are hence being implemented in a growing
number of countries; the use of international human rights instruments in
national courts; non-cosmopolitan forms of global politics and imaginar-
ies that remain deeply attached to or focused on localized issues and
struggles yet are part of global lateral networks containing multiple other
such localized efforts. A particular challenge in the work of identifying
these types of processes and actors as part of globalization is the need to
decode at least some of what continues to be experienced and repre-
sented as national.
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Here I want to focus particularly on these types of practices and dy-
namics and conceptualize them as constitutive of global scalings we do
not usually recognize as such. When the social sciences focus on global-
ization-still rare enough-it is typically not on these types of practices
and dynamics but rather on the self-evidently global scale. And although
the social sciences have made important contributions to the study of this
self-evident global scale by establishing the fact of multiple globaliza-
tions,' only some of which correspond to neoliberal corporate economic
globalization, there is much work left. At least some of this work entails
distinguishing: a) the various scales that global processes constitute, rang-
ing from supranational and global to subnational; 3 and b) the specific
contents and institutional locations of this multi-scalar globalization.4 It is
the latter consideration that concerns me in this paper. Geography more
than any other of the social sciences today has contributed to a critical
stance toward scale, recognizing the historicity of scales and resisting the
reification of the national scale so present in most of social science.
II. THE SUBNATIONAL: A SITE FOR GLOBALIZATION
Studying the global, then, entails not only a focus on that which is
explicitly global in scale, but also a focus on locally scaled practices and
conditions articulated with global dynamics and a focus on the multipli-
cation of cross-border connections among various localities. Further, it
entails recognizing that many of the globally scaled dynamics, such as
the global capital market, actually are partly embedded in subnational
sites and move between these differently scaled practices and organiza-
tional forms. For instance, the global capital market is constituted both
through electronic markets with global span, and through locally embed-
ded conditions, i.e., financial centers.
2. See, e.g., A.RJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE (1996); Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Fed-
eralism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769 (1998); Barry Eichengreen &
Albert Fishlow, Contending with Capital Flows, in CAPITAL FLOWS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 23
(Miles Kahler ed., 1998).
3. See GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE
(Ash Amin & N.J. Thrift eds., 1994); Erik Swyngedouw, Neither Global nor Local: "Glocali-
zation " and the Politics of Scale, in SPACES OF GLOBALIZATION: REASSERTING THE POWER OF
THE LOCAL 137 (Kevin R. Cox ed., 1997); Peter J. Taylor, World Cities and Territorial States
under Conditions of Contemporary Globalization, 19 POL. GEOGRAPHY 5 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Richard Howitt, "A World in a Grain of Sand": Towards a Reconceptuali-
sation of Geographical Scale, 24 AUSTRALIAN GEOGRAPHER 33-44 (1993); Katherine T.
Jones, Scale as Epistemology, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 25 (1998); Doreen Massey, Politics and
Space/lime, in PLACE AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 141 (Michael Keith & Steve Pile eds.,
1993).
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A focus on such subnationally based processes and dynamics of
globalization requires methodologies and theorizations that engage not
only global scalings but also subnational scalings as components of
global processes, thereby destabilizing older hierarchies of scale and
conceptions of nested scalings. Studying global processes and conditions
that get constituted subnationally has some advantages over studies of
globally scaled dynamics, but it also poses specific challenges. It does
make possible the use of long-standing research techniques, from quanti-
tative to qualitative, in the study of globalization. It also gives us a
bridge for using the wealth of national and subnational data sets as well
as specialized scholarships such as area studies. Both types of studies,
however, need to be situated in conceptual architectures that are not quite
those held by the researchers who generated these research techniques
and data sets, as their efforts mostly had little to do with globalization.
One central task we face is to decode particular aspects of what is
still represented or experienced as "national" which may in fact have
shifted away from what had historically been considered or constituted
as national. This is in many ways a research and theorization logic that is
the same as that developed in the economics of global city studies. But
there is a difference; today we have come around to recognize and code
a variety of components in global cities as part of the global. What I am
trying to focus on here engages a range of conditions and dynamics that
are to be distinguished from those global city components in that they
are still coded and represented as local and national; further, my concern
in this paper is largely the realm of the political rather than economic.
Three types of cases serve to illustrate some of the conceptual,
methodological, and empirical issues in this type of study. One of these
concerns the role of place in many of the circuits constitutive of eco-
nomic and political globalization. A focus on places allows us to
unbundle globalization in terms of the multiple specialized cross-border
circuits on which different types of places are located.5 Yet another ex-
ample is that of global cities as subnational places where multiple global
circuits intersect and thereby position these cities on several structured
cross-border geographies, each typically with distinct scopes and consti-
tuted in terms of distinct practices and actors.6 This type of analysis
5. Elsewhere I examine the emergence of forms of globality centered on localized
struggles and actors that are part of cross-border networks; this is a form of global politics that
runs not through global institutions but through local ones. SASKIA SASSEN, DENATIONALIZA-
TION: TERRITORY, AUTHORITY AND RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL DIGITAL AGE Ch. 7 (forthcoming
2005).
6. For instance, at least some of the circuits connecting Sao Paulo to global dynamics
are different from those of Frankfurt, Johannesburg, or Bombay. Further, distinct sets of
overlapping circuits contribute to the constitution of distinctly structured cross-border
geographies: we are, for instance, seeing the intensifying of older hegemonic geographies,
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produces a different picture about globalization from one centered on
global firms and markets, international trade, or the pertinent suprana-
tional institutions. It is not that one type of focus is better than the other,
but rather that the latter focus, the most common focus by far, is not
enough.
A second type of case, partly involved in that described above, is the
role of the new interactive technologies in repositioning the local,
thereby inviting us to a critical examination of how we conceptualize the
local. Through these new technologies a financial services firm becomes
a microenvironment with continuous global span. But so do resource-
poor organizations or households: they can also become microenviron-
,ments with global span, as might be the case with activist organizations.
These microenvironments can be oriented to other such microenviron-
ments located far away, thereby destabilizing both the notion of context
which is often imbricated with that of the local and the notion that
physical proximity is one of the attributes or markers of the local. A
critical reconceptualization of the local along these lines entails an at
least partial rejection of the notion that local scales are inevitably part of
nested hierarchies of scale running from the local to the regional, the
national, the international.
A third type of case concerns a specific set of interactions between
global dynamics and particular components of national states. The cru-
cial conditionality here is the partial embeddedness of the global in the
national, of which the global city is perhaps emblematic. My main ar-
gument here is that insofar as specific structurations of the global inhabit
what has historically been constructed and institutionalized as national
territory, this engenders a variety of negotiations. One set of outcomes
evident today is what I describe as an incipient, highly specialized, and
partial denationalization of specific components of national states.
In all three instances the question of scaling takes on very specific
contents in that these are practices and dynamics that, I argue, pertain to
the constituting of the global yet are taking place at what has been histori-
cally constructed as the scale of the national. With few exceptions, most
prominent among which is a growing scholarship in geography, the social
sciences have not had critical distance, i.e., historicized, the scale of the
national. The consequence has been a tendency to take it as a fixed scale,
e.g., the increase in transactions among New York, Miami, Mexico City, and Sao Paulo. See,
e.g., Christof Parnreiter, Mexico: The Making of a Global City, in GLOBAL NETWORKS,
LINKED CITIES 145 (Saskia Sassen ed., 2002); Sueli Ramos Schiffer, Sao Paulo: Articulating a
Cross-Border Region, in GLOBAL NETWORKS, supra, at 209, as well as newly constituted
geographies, e.g., the articulation of Shanghai with a rapidly growing number of cross-border
circuits, see Felicity Rose Gu & Zilai Tang, Shanghai: Reconnecting to the Global Economy,
in GLOBAL NETWORKS, supra, at 273.
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reifying it, and, more generally, to neutralize the question of scaling, or at
best to reduce scaling to a hierarchy of size. Associated with this ten-
dency is also the often uncritical assumption that these scales are
mutually exclusive, most pertinently for my argument here, that the scale
of the national is mutually exclusive with that of the global. A qualifying
variant which allows for mutual imbrications, though of a very limited
sort, can be seen when scaling is conceived of as a nested hierarchy.
Finally, the three cases described above go against those assump-
tions and propositions that are now often captured through the concept of
methodological nationalism. But they do so in a distinct way. Crucial to
the critique of methodological nationalism is the need for transnational-
ism because the nation as container category is inadequate given the
proliferation of transboundary dynamics and formation.8 What I am fo-
cusing on here is a set of reasons other than transnationalism for
supporting the critique of methodological nationalism; the fact of multi-
ple and specific structures of the global inside what has historically been
constructed as national. Further, I posit that because the national is
highly institutionalized and thick, structurations of the global inside the
national entail a partial, typically highly specialized and specific dena-
tionalization of particular components of the national. 9
7. In my early research on the global city I began to understand some of these ques-
tions of reified scales. Much of the literature on global and world cities has a critical appraisal
of questions of scaling, but with important exceptions, see Neil Brenner, Global Cities, Glocal
States: Global City Formation and State Territorial Restructuring in Contemporary Europe, 5
REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 1 (1998); Peter J. Taylor, World Cities and Territorial States: The Rise
and Fall of their Mutuality, in WORLD CITIES IN A WORLD-SYSTEM 48 (Paul L. Knox et al.
eds., 1995), this appraisal tends to be in embryo, undertheorized, and not quite explicated. On
the other hand, the scholarship on "glocalization" recognizes and theorizes questions of scale
but often remains attached to a notion of nested scalings. See, e.g., Swyngedouw, supra note 3.
I find that among the literatures in geography that come closest in their conceptualization,
albeit focused on very different issues, to what I develop in this lecture are those on first-
nation peoples' rights claiming. See, e.g., Howitt, supra note 4; Claudia Notzke, A New Per-
spective in Aboriginal Natural Resource Management: Co-Management, 26 GEOFORUM 187-
209 (1995); Steven E. Silvem, Scales of Justice: Law, American Indian Treaty Rights and the
Political Construction of Scale, 18 POL. GEOGRAPHY 639-68 (1999). Clearly, there is a par-
ticularly illuminating positioning of the issues in this case because. from the outset there is:
a) the co-existence of two exclusive claims over a single territory; and b) the endogeneity of
both types of claims-that of the modem sovereign and that of the indigenous nation. In my
case here in this lecture, it is the coexistence of the claim of the historical sovereign and the
claim of the global as endogenized in the re-constituted sovereign. For a full development of
this somewhat abstract statement, see SASSEN, supra note 5, at Chs. 4 and 5.
8. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 3; Ulrich Beck, Global Democracy: The Higher Poli-
tics of the Nation-State, 5(18) METAPOLfTICA 66-71 (2001).
9. I have developed this at greater length in Saskia Sassen, Embedding the Global in
the National: Implications for the Role of the State, in STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 158 (David A. Smith et al. eds., 1999), and SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CON-
TROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996). I should clarify that when I first
developed the construct "de-nationalization" in the 1995 Memorial Schoff Lectures I intended
1147Summer 2004]
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III. THE DESTABILIZING OF OLDER HIERARCHIES OF SCALE
Various components of globalization bring with them a destabilizing
of older hierarchies of scale-scales and hierarchies constituted through
the practices and power projects of past eras, with the national scale
eventually emerging as the preeminent one. Most notable today is what
is sometimes seen as a return to older imperial spatialities for the eco-
nomic operations of the most powerful actors: the formation of a global
market for capital, a global trade regime, and the internationalization of
manufacturing production. It is, of course, not simply a return to older
forms: it is crucial to recognize the specificity of today's practices and
the capabilities enabling these practices. This specificity partly consists
of the fact that today's transboundary spatialities had to be produced in a
context where most territory is encased in a thick and highly formalized
national framework marked by the exclusive authority of the national
state. This is, in my reading, one of the key features of the current phase
of globalization, and it entails the necessary participation of national
states in the formation of global systems.'"
The global project of powerful firms, the new technical capabilities
associated with information and communications technologies, and some
components of the work of states have together constituted scales other
than the national as strategic today. Most important among these are
subnational scales such as the global city, and supranational scales such
as global markets. These processes and practices also contained a desta-
bilizing of the scale hierarchies that expressed the power relations and
political economy of an earlier period. These were, and to a good extent
continue to be, organized in terms of institutional size and territorial
scope: from the international, down to the national, the regional, the ur-
ban, to the local, with the national functioning as the articulator of this
particular configuration. That is to say, the crucial practices and institu-
tional arrangements that constituted the system occurred at the national
it to denote a specific dynamic. I did not intend it as some general notion that can be used
interchangeably with post-national, global, or other such terms. In this regard see the debate in
7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447-601 (2000).
10. SASSEN, supra note 9, at 1-58. Diverging somewhat from what has emerged as the
main proposition in globalization research-growing interdependence-I argue that the mark-
ing condition for globalization is the way in which the national has been constructed over the
last century (with different temporal frames in different countries). From here then comes my
emphasis on denationalization: the necessity to denationalize specific structurations inside this
thickly constructed and highly formalized national context. This type of focus allows us to
capture the enormous variability across countries in terms of the incorporation/negotiation/
resistance of globalization, since these are partly shaped by the specifics, both de facto and de
jure, of each country; at the same time, it avoids the trap of comparative studies in that it in-
troduces the thesis that the conditionalities of a global system need to be partly met through
specific structurations in multiple countries. See SASSEN, supra note 5, at Pt. II.
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level. Notwithstanding multiple different temporal frames, the history of
the modern state can be read as the work of rendering national just about
all crucial features of society: authority, identity, territory, security, law,
capital accumulation. Earlier periods to that of the ascendance of the
national state saw rather different types of scalings, with territories typi-
cally subject to multiple systems of rule rather than the exclusive
authority of the state.
Today's rescaling dynamics cut across institutional size and across
the institutional encasements of territory produced by the formation of
national states." This does not mean that the old hierarchies disappear,
but rather that rescalings emerge alongside the old ones, and that the
former can often trump the latter. Older hierarchies of scale constituted
as part of the development of the nation-state continue to operate, but
they do so in a far less exclusive field than they did in the recent past,
even when we factor in the hegemonic power of a few states, which
meant and continues to mean that most national states were in practice
not sovereign.
Existing theory is not enough to map today's multiplication of prac-
tices and actors constitutive of these rescalings. This includes a variety
of non-state actors and forms of cross-border cooperation and conflict,
such as global business networks, the new cosmopolitanism, NGOs, di-
asporic networks, and spaces such as global cities and transboundary
public spheres. International Relations theory is the field that to date has
had the most to say about cross-border relations. But current develop-
ments associated with various mixes of globalization and the new
information and communications technologies point to the limits of In-
ternational Relations theory and data. Several critical scholars'2 have
shown us how its models and theories remain focused on the logic of
relations between states and the scale of the state at a time when we see
a proliferation of non-state actors, cross-border processes, and associated
changes in the scope, exclusivity, and competence of state authority over
its territory. Theoretical developments in other disciplines may prove
important; especially relevant is, as I already mentioned above, geogra-
phy and its contributions to critical analyses of scale, unlike other social
11. Saskia Sassen, The Locational and Institutional Embeddedness of the Global Econ-
omy, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL
PROSPECTS 47 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
12. See THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Rodney
Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002); POLITICAL SPACE: FRONTIERS OF CHANGE
AND GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 61 (Yale H. Ferguson & R.J. Barry Jones eds.,
2002); Phillip G. Cerny, Structuring the Political Arena: Public Goods, States and Govern-
ance in a Globalizing World, in GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONTEMPORARY THEORIES 21
(Ronen Palan ed., 2000).
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sciences which tend to take scale as a given and the national scale as a
naturalized condition.
A second feature is the multiscalar character of various globalization
processes that do not fit into older conceptions of hierarchies of scale or
conceptions of nested hierarchies. Perhaps most familiar here is, again,
the bundle of conditions and dynamics that marks the model of the
global city. In its most abstract formulation this is captured in what I see
as one of the key organizing hypotheses of the global city model, to wit,
that the more globalized and digitized the operations of firms and mar-
kets, the more their central management and specialized servicing
functions (and the requisite material structures) become strategic and
complex, thereby benefiting from agglomeration economies. 3 To vari-
able extents these agglomeration economies are still delivered through
territorial concentrations of multiple resources. This points to multiple
scales that cannot be organized as a hierarchy or a nested hierarchy: for
example, far-flung networks of affiliates of multinational firms along
with the concentration of strategic functions in a single or in a very lim-
ited number of locations. This is a multiscalar system, operating across
scales and not merely scaling upward because of new communication
capabilities." Some of these issues assume particular contents and loca-
tions when it comes to the political domain. This is the focus of the next
section.
IV. THE PARTIAL DENATIONALIZING OF STATE WORK
How does the analytics briefly developed in the first half of this pa-
per map onto the main scholarship on globalization and the state, much
of it coming from political science? At what points does this analytics
deborder or contest propositions in that scholarship?
The literature on the state and globalization is large and growing. A
number of scholars have addressed various dimensions of the particular
issue that concerns me here, participation by the state in global processes.
13. For what I define as the organizing hypotheses of the global city model please see
the Overview to SASSEN, supra note 1. In preparing this new edition I was far more able to
formulate these nine hypotheses than I was in writing the first edition, partly thanks to the
enormously rich and varied literature produced during the 1990s and the equally rich and
varied (though not always as enjoyable) criticisms the first edition provoked.
14. See, e.g., Peter J. Taylor et al., Firms and their Global Service Networks, in GLOBAL
NETWORKS, LINKED CITIES, supra note 6, at 93; Globalization and World Cities Study Group
& Network, at http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/.
15. Thus I would distinguish this from the case of illegal traffickers of people who have
now been able to go global, where before they were regional, because of the infrastructure for
communications and money transfers brought about by globalization. For a development of
this argument see Sassen, supra note 11.
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For some, states remain as the key actors and hence not much has
changed for states and the interstate system.16 For others, even if states
remain important there are today other key actors, and globalization has
changed some important features of states and the interstate system. 7
My particular argument is that we are seeing the incipient formation
of a type of authority and state practice that entails a partial denationaliz-
ing of what had been constructed historically as national. Even if we
accept that the present era is, at a very general level, a continuation of a
long history of changes that have not altered the fundamental fact of
state primacy, it still leaves us with the need for detailed research about
the specificities of the current changes.'8 In this conceptualization I in-
troduce a twist in the various analyses on the broader subject. First, it
needs to be distinguished from analyses of private authority because
these emphasize the shift out of the public domain and into the private
domain. 9 I seek to detect the presence of private agendas and authority
16. See, e.g., CHALLENGE TO THE NATION-STATE (Christian Joppke ed., 1998); Eric
Helleiner, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Globalization of Finance, in STATES AND SOV-
EREIGNTY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 138 (David A. Smith et al. eds., 1999); PAUL HIRST &
GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND
THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE (1996); Stephen D. Krasner, Globalization, Power, and
Authority, in THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE: DEMOCRACY, AUTONOMY, AND
CONFLICT IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 60 (Edward D. Mansfield & Rich-
ard Sisson eds., 2004); Louis W. Pauly, Global Finance, Political Authority, and the Problem
of Legitimation, in EMERGENCE, supra note 12.
17. See, e.g., PHILLIP G. CERNY, THE CHANGING ARCHITECTURE OF POLITICS: STRUC-
TURE, AGENCY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE STATE (1990); Cerny, supra note 12; Ken Dark, The
Informational Reconfiguring of Global Geopolitics, in POLITICAL SPACE, supra note 12, at 61;
Ronen Palan, Offshore and the Institutional Environment of Globalization, in POLITICAL
SPACE, supra note 12, at 211; PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (A. Claire
Cutler et al. eds., 1999); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF
POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Cambridge Stud. in Int'l Relations No. 49, 1996).
For what is probably the most comprehensive mapping of the main strands in the schol-
arship on globalization and the state, see DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS:
POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE (1999), who categorize the two major emerging strands
as "hyperglobalists," who posit that national states are becoming weak and are on their way
out, and "transformationists," who contend that globalization has brought about significant
changes in state authority and the work of states. At a time when we put increasing weight on
self-reflexivity, I should perhaps clarify that Held et al. classify me as a transformationist,
which is appropriate as far as my work on the state goes, but not quite when I look at structu-
rations of the global that may not run through the state.
18. Along these lines of analysis, I argue that economic globalization is in fact a poli-
tico-economic system partly located inside national states, SASSEN, supra note 9, at 1-53,
thereby having the effect of partly denationalizing specific, often highly specialized compo-
nents of state work. SASSEN, supra note 5, at Ch. 5.
19. A growing literature that often overlaps with particular parts of the above cited
strands in the scholarship emphasizes the relocation of national public government functions
to private actors both within national and transnational domains. See, e.g., Aman, supra note 2;
PRIVATE AUTHORITY, supra note 17. For a state-of-the-art elaboration of the rise of private
authority, see EMERGENCE, supra note 12. For the emergence of cross-border governance
mechanisms, see POLITICAL SPACE, supra note 12.
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inside the public domain represented by the state. 0 Second, I emphasize
the privatization of norm-making capacities which were once in the pub-
lic domain and today's enactment of these norms in the public domain.
This perspective also differs, then, from a literature that emphasizes the
decline and obsoleteness of the state.2' It comes close to the scholarship• 22
that emphasizes state transformation even though this literature tends to
discard the specificity of the current phase of globalization.23
One of my efforts here is, then, to blur some longstanding dualities
in state scholarship, notably, those concerning the distinctive spheres of
influence of respectively the national and the global, of state and non-
state actors, of the private and the public.24 While it may indeed be the
case that mostly the two sides of the duality are separate and mutually
exclusive, I argue for the critical importance of recognizing and deci-
phering conditions or components that do not fit in this dual structure.n
In the case of U.S. law, one domain where this debordering plays out in
what I find intriguing ways is the relation between Federalism and sev-
26eral new global regimes. An important methodological assumption here
20. A good examination of these issues as they materialize in specific institutional
settings can be found in Aman, supra note 2. An excellent collection of essays that seeks to
capture these types of dynamics can be found in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES (Michael
Likosky ed., 2002).
21. Perhaps the best known, though not necessarily the most precise, authors here are
KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (1996), and WALTER B. WRISTON, THE
TWILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY: HOW THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING OUR
WORLD (1992); see also Benjamin J. Cohen, Electronic Money: New Day or False Dawn?, 8
REv. INT'L POL. ECON. 197 (1998); Stephen J. Kobrin, The MAI and the Clash of Globaliza-
tions, 112 FOREIGN POL'Y 97 (1998).
22. There is today a growing literature that interprets deregulation and privatization as
the incorporation by the state of its own shrinking role; in its most formalized version this
position emphasizes the state's constitutionalizing of its own diminished role. See ROBERT W.
Cox, PRODUCTION, POWER AND WORLD ORDER (1987); JAMES H. MITTELMAN, THE GLOBAL-
IZATION SYNDROME (2000); Stephen Gill, Globalization, Democratization, and the Politics of
Indifference, in GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 205 (James H. Mittelman ed.,
1996); Leo Panitch, Rethinking the Role of the State, in GLOBALIZATION, supra, at 83.
23. Perhaps the best example is Helleiner, supra note 16, at 138 (examining the regula-
tory changes brought on by the emergence of global financial systems and showing how states
remain as key actors). See also supra note 7.
24. A good source in this regard is THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, supra
note 16, containing papers by major scholars in international relations addressing key issues
about the state and the current features of the interstate system, with responses by critics from
other disciplines.
25. See, e.g., TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND
POLITICAL PROSPECTS (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000); MARK W. ZACHER & BRENT A.
SUTTON, GOVERNING GLOBAL NETWORKS (1996).
26. For a development of some of these issues, please refer to Saskia Sassen, Territory
and Territoriality in the Global Economy, 15 INT'L SOCIOLOGY 372 (2000). In this context, I
find interesting parallels in a specific type of legal scholarship focused on the construction of
jurisdictions and the locating of particular issues in jurisdictions that may today be less and
less adequate. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, International Regulatory Cooperation and US
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is that focusing on economic globalization can help us disentangle some
of these issues. 7
The embeddedness of the global requires at least a partial lifting of
these national encasements and hence signals a necessary participation
by the state, even when it concerns the state's own withdrawal from
regulating the economy. Does the weight of private, often foreign, inter-
ests in this specific work of the state become constitutive of a particular
form of state authority that does not replace but works alongside older
well-established forms of state authority?28 My argument is that the mix
of processes we describe as globalization is indeed producing, deep in-
side the national state, a very partial but significant form of authority, a
hybrid that is neither fully private nor fully public, neither fully national
nor fully global.29
Federalism, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 373; see also
JUDITH RESNIK, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J.
619 (2001) (offering an extraordinary analysis).
27. Beyond issues pertaining to the global economy, the question of state participation
is also at the heart of a far broader debate about globalization and the state. There is an older
scholarship on world-order systems, see, e.g., RICHARD FALK, EXPLORATIONS AT THE EDGE OF
TIME: THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD ORDER (1992); Richard Falk, The Making of Global Citi-
zenship, in GLOBAL VISIONS: BEYOND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (Jeremy Brecher et al. eds.,
1993); recently invigorated by debates about cosmopolitanism, see, e.g., DAVID HELD, DE-
MOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN
GOVERNANCE (1995); GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE
(David Held et al. eds., 1999). It examines and theorizes the possibilities of transcending na-
tionally oriented state authority and instituting world-level institutional orders. This literature
often includes partial world-level orders such as the international human rights regime, see,
e.g., GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, (Alison Brysk ed., 2002), or certain features of
international environmental treaties, see, e.g., RONNIE D. LIPSCHUTZ & JUDITH MAYER,
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: THE POLITICS OF NA-
TURE FROM PLACE TO PLANET (1996), and, quite prominently, discussions about the
possibility of a global civil society, see, e.g., GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2001 (Helmut Anheier et
al. eds., 2001).
28. Several scholars have focused on the nature of this engagement. See, e.g., PAUL N.
DOREMUS ET AL., THE MYTH OF THE GLOBAL CORPORATION (1998); GLOBAL CAPITALISM
VERSUS DEMOCRACY (Leo Panitch & Colin Leys eds., 1999); STRANGE, supra note 17; Cerny,
supra note 12; Dark, supra note 17; Boris Kagarlitsky, The Challenge for the Left: Reclaiming
the State, in GLOBAL CAPITALISM, supra; Jan Aart Scholte, Global Capitalism and the State,
73 INT'L AFFAIRS 427 (1997). One way of organizing the major issues is to ask whether the
role of the state is simply one of reducing its authority--e.g., as suggested with terms such as
deregulation and privatization, and generally "less government"---or whether it also requires
the production of new types of regulations, legislative items, court decisions, in brief, the
production of a whole series of new "legalities". I use this term to distinguish this production
from "law" or "jurisprudence." SASSEN, supra note 9, at 1-30.
29. Among the issues raised by this type of analysis are the increased autonomy and
influence of a whole variety of types of processes and actors, including non-state actors. The
literature on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including transnational ones (TNGOs),
and the associated forms of activism, has also generated a series of interesting insights into the
changed position of states in a context of multiple globalizations. See, e.g., CONSTRUCTING
WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875 (John
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As states participate in the implementation of cross-border regimes,
whether the global economic system or the international human rights
regime, they have undergone at times significant transformations be-
cause this accommodation entails a negotiation. In the case of the global
economy, this negotiation entails the development inside national
states-through legislative acts, court rulings, executive orders, policy-
of the mechanisms necessary for the reconstitution of certain compo-
nents of national capital into "global capital", and necessary to develop
and ensure new types of rights/entitlements for foreign capital3" in what
are still national territories in principle under the exclusive authority of
their states.3
These particular transformations inside the state are partial and in-
cipient but strategic. Such transformations can weaken or alter the
organizational architecture for the implementation of international law
insofar as the latter depends on the institutional apparatus of national
Boli & George M. Thomas eds., 1999); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS
BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); ROBERT
O'BRIEN ET AL., CONTESTING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC INSTITU-
TIONS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2000). For a critical account that partly rejects the
notion that these non-state actors actually represent a politics that undermines existing forms
of authority, including that of the state, see Andr6 C. Drainville, Left Internationalism and the
Politics of Resistance in the New World Order, in A NEW WORLD ORDER?: GLOBAL TRANS-
FORMATIONS IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (David A. Smith & J6zsef BOr6cz eds.,
1995). I would also include here a variety of emergent global networks that are fighting
equally emergent global agents such as trafficking gangs. See, e.g., GILLIAN CALDWELL,
CRIME & SERVITUDE: AN EXPOSt OF THE TRAFFIC IN WOMEN FOR PROSTITUTION FROM THE
NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES (1997). For a general review of these types of organizations,
see Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization, in EMERGENCE, supra note 12, at 91. Along
these lines a new set of concrete instances has come about with the September 11, 2001 attack
on the World Trade Center, i.e., the use by international organized terrorism of the global
financial system and the international immigration regime. For a variety of analyses, see
CRAIG CALHOUN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SEPTEMBER 11 (2002), and Saskia Sassen, Gov-
ernance Hotspots: Challenges We Must Confront in the Post-September 11 World, in
CALHOUN ET AL., supra.
30. Seen from the perspective of firms and investors operating transnationally, the ob-
jective is to enjoy the protections traditionally exercised by the state in the national realm of
the economy for national firms, notably guaranteeing property rights and contracts. How this
gets done may involve a range of options. See, e.g., EMERGENCE, supra note 12; PRIVATE AU-
THORITY, supra note 17.
31. Two very different bodies of scholarship which develop lines of analysis that can
help in capturing some of these conditions are represented by the work of Rousenau, particu-
larly his examination of the domestic "frontier" inside the national state, JAMES N. ROSENAU,
ALONG THE DOMESTIC-FOREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORING GOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT
WORLD (Cambridge Stud. in Int'l Relations No. 53, 1997), and by the work of Walker prob-
lematizing the distinction inside/outside in international relations theory, R.B.J. WALKER,
INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY (Cambridge Stud. in
Int'l Relations No. 24, 1993). An interesting variant on this subject is INTERVENTION AND
TRANSNATIONALISM IN AFRICA: GLOBAL-LOCAL NETWORKS OF POWER (Thomas M. Callaghy
et al. eds., 2001), which examines the proliferation of global non-state-centered networks in
the case of Africa.
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states. Further, they have also created the conditions whereby some parts
of national states actually gain relative power as a result of that participa-
tion in the development of a global economy. As particular components
of national states become the institutional home for the operation of
some of the dynamics that are central to globalization, they undergo
change that is difficult to register or name. This is one instantiation of
what I call a process of incipient de-nationalization.
This partial, often highly specialized or at least particularized, dena-
tionalization can also take place in domains other than that of economic
globalization, notably the more recent developments in the human rights
32regime which allow national courts to sue foreign firms and dictators or
which grant undocumented immigrants certain rights. Denationalization
is, thus, multivalent: it endogenizes global agendas of many different
types of actors, not only corporate firms and financial markets, but also
human rights objectives.
The question for research then becomes: What is actually "national"
in some of the institutional components of states linked to the implemen-
tation and regulation of economic globalization? The hypothesis here
would be that some components of national institutions, even though
formally national, are not national in the sense in which we have con-
structed the meaning of that term over the last hundred years. One of the
roles of the state vis-gi-vis today's global economy has been to negotiate
the intersection of national law and foreign actors-whether firms, mar-
kets, or supranational organizations. This raises a question as to whether
there are particular conditions that make execution of this role in the cur-
rent phase distinctive and unlike what it may have been in earlier phases
of the world economy.
We need to understand more about the nature of this engagement than
is represented by concepts such as deregulation. It is becoming clear that
the role of the state in the process of deregulation involves the production
of new types of regulations, legislative items, court decisions,33 in brief,
the production of a whole series of new "legalities. 3 It also is evident in
32. See, e.g., BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996).
33. See, e.g., Phillip Cemy, Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political
Globalization, 32 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 251 (1996); Panitch, supra note 22; see also SOL
PICCIOTTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION: A STUDY IN THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
BUSINESS REGULATION (1992); REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BEYOND
LIBERALIZATION (Sol Picciotto & Ruth Mayne eds., 1999).
34. For a broad range of views, see, for example, LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS
(Judith Goldstein et al. eds., 2001); GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
& John D. Donahue eds., 2000); for more particular cases of this broader issue, see REGULATING
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 33; ROSENAU, supra note 31; Aman, supra note 2; Ei-
chengreen & Fishlow, supra note 2; Aihwa Ong, Strategic Sisterhood or Sisters in Solidarity?:
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the proliferation of specialized, often semi-autonomous regulatory agen-
cies and the specialized cross-border networks they are forming which
are taking over functions once enclosed in national legal frameworks."
The background condition here is that the state remains as the ultimate
guarantor of the "rights" of global capital, i.e., the protection of contracts
and property rights, and, more generally, a major legitimator of claims.36
It is in this sense that the state can be seen as incorporating the global
project of its own shrinking role in regulating economic transactions37
and giving it operational effectiveness and legitimacy. 8 The state here
can be conceived of as representing a technical administrative capacity
which cannot be replicated at this time by any other institutional ar-
rangement; furthermore, this is a capacity backed by military power,
albeit not an option in many countries, and with global power in the case
of some states. To some extent this work of states is becoming privat-
ized, as is signaled by the growth of international commercial
arbitration,39 and by key elements of the new privatized institutional or-
der for governing the global economy.40
Legislative items, executive orders, adherence to new technical stan-
dards, and so on, will have to be produced through the particular
institutional and political structures of each participating state. Even when
imposed from the outside, there is specific work that individual states need
Questions of Communitarianism and Citizenship in Asia, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 107
(1996).
35. We can see this in particular features of a variety of domains: for instance, competi-
tion policy, GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY (Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson eds.,
1997); Brian Portnoy, Constructing Competition: Antitrust and the Political Foundations of
Global Capitalism (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file
with author), specific aspects of international business collaboration, JOHN DUNNING, ALLI-
ANCE CAPITALISM AND GLOBAL BUSINESS (1997); in networks among members of the
judiciary, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks
Accountable, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITI-
CAL PROSPECTS 521 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000), and, in a very different domain,
the new opening among the top leadership in a growing number of unions organizing immi-
grants, LEAH A. HAUS, UNIONS, IMMIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONALIZATION: NEW
CHALLENGES AND CHANGING COALITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE (2002).
36. While it is well-known, it is worth remembering that this guarantee of the rights of
capital is embedded in a certain type of state, a certain conception of the rights of capital, and
a certain type of international legal regime: it is largely embedded in the state of the most
developed and most powerful countries in the world, in western notions of contract and prop-
erty rights, and in new legal regimes aimed at furthering economic globalization, e.g., the push
to get countries to support copyright law.
37. See GLOBAL CAPITALISM, supra note 28; Gill, supra note 22.
38. SASSEN, supra note 5.
39. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996).
40. See generally PRIVATE AUTHORITY, supra note 17.
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to do.4 ' The emergent, often imposed, consensus in the community of states
to further globalization is not merely a political decision; it entails specific
types of work by a large number of distinct state institutions in each of these
countries. Clearly, the role of the state will vary significantly depending on
the power it may have both internally and internationall 2 It is in fact some
states, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, which are
producing the design for many of these new legalities, i.e., items derived
from Anglo-American commercial law and accounting standards, and are
hence imposing these on other states given the interdependencies at the
heart of the current phase of globalization. This creates and imposes a set of
specific constraints on the other participating states.43
There is in this dynamic an interesting dialectic. These types of state
participation can contribute to strengthen the forces that can challenge or
destabilize what have historically been constructed as state powers. 44 In
my reading this holds both for the United States and for other countries.
The U.S. government as the hegemonic power of this period has
led/forced other states to adopt these obligations toward global capital and,
in so doing, contributes to globalize conditions that reduce particular
forms of state authority in more and more countries around the world. One
way in which this becomes evident is in the fact that while the state con-
tinues to play a crucial, though no longer exclusive, role in the production
of legality around new forms of economic activity, at least some of this
production of legalities is increasingly feeding the power of new emerging
structures, whether global markets for capital, WTO, or the international
human rights regime.
Concluding, a crucial part of the argument is, then, the fact of the in-
stitutional and locational embeddedness of globalization. Let me specify
41. In terms of research and theorization, one of my concerns, this is a vast uncharted
terrain: it would mean examining how that production takes place and gets legitimated in
different countries. This signals the possibility of cross-national variations (which then would
need to be established, measured, and interpreted).
42. I have developed this at greater length addressing an audience of legal scholars in
Sassen, supra note 11. See also the development of the argument focusing on private rather
than state actors in SASSEN, supra note 1.
43. This dominance assumes many forms and does not only affect poorer and weaker
countries. France, for instance, ranks among the top providers of information services and
industrial engineering services in Europe and has a strong though not outstanding position in
financial and insurance services. But it has found itself at an increasing disadvantage in legal
and accounting services because Anglo-American law and standards dominate in international
transactions. Anglo-American firms with offices in Paris do the servicing of the legal needs of
firms, whether French or foreign, operating out of France. See also Sassen, supra note 11.
Similarly, Anglo-American law is increasingly dominant in international commercial arbitra-
tion, an institution grounded in continental traditions of jurisprudence, particularly French and
Swiss. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 39.
44. See in this regard GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY: MONEY,
POWER, AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIMES (1994).
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why it matters. First, it provides the empirical specification for the propo-
sition that the state is engaged in globalization rather than subjected to it.
This in turn feeds the proposition about the denationalizing of particular
state functions and capacities arising out of this participation.
Second, it signals that the range of ways in which the state could be
involved is conceivably far broader than what it is today, largely confined
to furthering economic globalization. In principle, state involvement could
address a whole series of global issues, including the democratic deficit in
the multilateral system governing globalization.45 State participation cre-
ates an enabling environment not only for global corporate capital but also
for those seeking to subject the latter to greater accountability and public
scrutiny. But unlike what has happened with global corporate capital, the
necessary legal and administrative instruments and regimes have not been
developed that would allow citizens to participate in global governance
through state institutions. The trade-offs and the resources that can be mo-
bilized are quite different in the case of citizens seeking to globalize their
capacities for governing compared to those of global capital seeking to
form regimes that enable and protect it."
45. There are several types of analyses that address particular forms of this question.
See, for example, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 27; Aman, supra note 2; Alfred C.
Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reform: Rejection, Relocation, or
Reinvention?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (1995), on how states could participate in
global governance; POLITICAL SPACE, supra note 12; Warren Magnusson, Politicizing the
Global City, in DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE GLOBAL CITY 289 (Engin F. Isin ed.,
2000), on how to rethink political space, PEOPLE OUT OF PLACE: GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND THE CITIZENSHIP GAP (Alison Brysk & Gershon Shafir eds., 2004), on the citi-
zenship gap in a global world and what states could do. For a very particular angle on these
issues, see CALHOUN ET AL., supra note 29, for a variety of authors seeking to understand how
the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 forced a rethinking of how globaliza-
tion has repositioned the U.S. state in the world and how to respond to the new types of
organized international terrorism.
46. Elsewhere, see SASSEN, supra note 5, at Ch. 6. I examine some of these issues from
the perspective of the institution of citizenship. This produces a domain for global politics that
can be distinguished from the notion developed above that state participation in the global
economy should function as a bridge for a country's citizens to participate in global govern-
ance. However, I see an emergent institutional resonance between the features of the state
discussed here and the features of an evolving institution of citizenship.
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